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ABSTRACT
The concepts of policy instruments and policy networks have played
important roles in recent theoretical development on public policy, as
research in several nations attests. These notions, however, have largely
been considered in isolation from each other. Here a simple typology
of policy networks is used to help explain the selection of different kinds
of instruments by governments. Several instrument characteristics are
considered for the expected impact of network features on instrument
selection, and a set of propositions is developed that matches degrees
of network interconnectedness and cohesion with the choice of different
kinds of instruments – such as regulations, subsidies, and covenants.
Examples from different national and policy-sectoral contexts are used
to indicate the plausibility of the argument. The article suggests that
considering network attributes can be useful in understanding
governments’ choice of instruments and can strengthen extant
discussions largely focused on such variables as learning and policy
style.
The two subjects of this article, policy networks and the choice of gov-
ernment instruments to be used to achieve policy objectives, have each
received extensive attention by scholars. Nonetheless, the core ideas
developed in each stream of research have been largely ignored in the
other.1 The purpose of the current article is to link these concepts as
* An earlier version of part of this argument by Bressers appeared in Dutch as ‘Beleidsnetwerken
en instrumentenkeuze’ [Policy networks and choice of instruments], Beleidswetenschap [Policy
Science] 7, 4 (1993): 309–330, and also published as ‘The Choice of Policy Instruments in
Policy Networks’ in B. Guy Peters and Frans K.M. van Nispen eds., Public Policy Instruments
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 85–105.
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the core of a theory of policy instrument choice and to suggest the
theory’s plausibility.
Much research into the application of policy instruments and their
impact on the target actors of public policy, or ‘target group’ for con-
venience, is aimed at providing information which can help the govern-
ment in its efforts to ameliorate social problems. Unfortunately, how-
ever, policy instruments are rarely selected on the basis of their
implementability and effectiveness. Different policy fields tend to show
preferences for their own ‘favourite’ types of policy instruments and
use these repeatedly regardless of their actual contribution to problem
solving. These tendencies limit governmental learning capacity, par-
ticularly when major new challenges present themselves – problems
that cannot be solved by minor policy adjustments.
Several aspects of a social setting can influence the choice of instru-
ments in the process of policy formation. This article aims to establish
how the choice of policy instruments is influenced by the characteristics
of the network of actors involved in considering a policy problem. This
objective imposes restrictions on the explanatory factors to be discus-
sed. It is assumed, however, that the influence of network character-
istics is sufficiently great to explain an empirically significant portion
of the instruments selected. The central problem addressed in this article is:
in what way do characteristics of policy networks influence the probability that
various types of instruments will be selected during the policy formation process?
The answer to this question is sought by means of a theoretical explora-
tion based on deduction from a central proposition grounded in social
and policy theory. The findings are then illustrated, though not rigor-
ously tested, with examples from policy practice primarily in two
national contexts.
The article begins with abbreviated reviews of research on networks
and instruments, and then offers a rationale for connecting the themes
theoretically. The two following sections present characteristics of net-
works and instruments, respectively. The two conceptual patterns are
then linked theoretically through the introduction of a core proposition
that, we argue, explains a significant part of what drives the choice
of government instruments. The theory is elaborated into some basic
expectations, and selected empirical evidence is introduced to illustrate
the theory.
The Burgeoning Interest in Policy Networks
The concept of policy network has received considerable attention in
recent years. Researchers based in the United Kingdom, the United
States, Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere have begun to use
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network notions to help describe and explain parts of policy action (a
sampling includes Bogason and Toonen 1998; Bressers, O’Toole and
Richardson 1994a; Haas 1992; Heclo 1978; Hufen and Ringeling
1990a; Jordan and Schubert 1992; Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn 1996;
Marin and Mayntz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; O’Toole 1997a and
1997b; Provan and Milward 1995; and Scharpf 1993). The surge of
interest has been fuelled in part by recognition of the complex array of
actors involved in policy choices as well as the inability of contemporary
government to move unilaterally without incorporating the constraints,
preferences, and resources of other social actors. As such, the trend is
a sign of renewed interest in developing robust theories of policy pro-
cesses. (Several recent and promising efforts to provide better theoret-
ical explanations for policy formation and change include, in particular,
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1996. See Schlager and Blomquist
1996 for a comparative analysis of this and other significant
approaches.)
Some research has been limited to characterizing the networks
involved in policy processes – primarily for policy formation but also for
implementation. Depicting policy networks, however, or simply showing
that they can be typical settings for policy choices, hardly takes one
very far. Indeed, if research were to stop at the simple (and implicitly
universal) observation that networks are part of the context for policy
design and action, nothing very significant would have been said (see
Bressers and O’Toole 1994). What are needed are theoretical advances
that use the network notion to explain some part of the variance in
policy processes, outputs, or outcomes (Bressers, O’Toole and Richard-
son 1994a).
While complex typologies have advantages, and while it is clear that
many empirical instances of policy networks contain a multitude of
actors linked in complicated ways, we simplify greatly in the exposition
that follows. We do so in the interest of initiating the development of
explicit and deductive theory that can be used as a starting point
for refinement and testing. Specifically, we simplify in at least three
ways.
First, we use the notion of network in an intentionally narrow sense:
to denote the pattern of relationship between a governmental authority
(like an agency or ministry), on the one hand, and the set of actors –
the ‘target group’ – toward which the governmental authority’s policy
efforts are directed, on the other. The very word ‘authority’ is used
with caution here. The emphasis on networks in policy research derives
from the fundamental point that governmental actors are not simply
and unilaterally authoritative; they depend on the actions and often the
acquiescence or support of others whom they do not directly control.
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Furthermore, the reference to ‘government’ or a ‘government author-
ity’ applies relatively easily in Parliamentary systems, less well in sep-
aration-of-power regimes, where the ‘government’ is often divided and
internally competitive. We ignore these distinctions here to avoid ren-
dering the analysis overly complex.
This full aggregation, including both government and sectoral
target groups rather than merely one or the other, is what is refer-
enced here by the term network. In short, we ignore the details of
the networked interdependence across target groups and concentrate
instead on the pattern of relationship within a relatively definable
cluster of targets (like an industrial sector) and between government
and target. (Note that networks are defined here in terms of the
system of actors that interact on a certain topic, rather than via a
particular level of intensity in that interaction. Although many actors
may be involved, we assume that the bulk of these often cluster into
two sides, or coalitions (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), in
which both the responsible authority and the actors specifically tar-
geted by policy proposals have their allies – probably each larger
array encompassing portions of both sides of the public-private
distinction.) This limitation necessarily means ignoring some import-
ant differences across cases but is a helpfully simplifying first step
for theory building.
Second, we concentrate on networks for policy formation. Policy net-
works operate around both formation and implementation. But even
for the same policy initiative, these networks may be different. To limit
scope and increase precision, this article focuses on how policy networks
function around the process of policy formation only – more precisely,
that portion of policy formation dealing with the selection of policy
instruments.
Third, we ignore many dimensions of the networked relationship
between government and target group. Despite the many ways that
networks have been typed and characterized, the most well-known and
frequently cited network distinction has been that highlighting the dif-
ference between issue networks, as conceptualized by Heclo (1978),
and policy communities (for instance Richardson and Jordan 1979).
While this distinction can obscure a great deal, employing it to make
sense of differences across national settings in policy action has been
shown to be productive (Bressers and O’Toole 1994). We develop a
relatively simple characterization of policy networks that builds upon
but formalizes some of the notions undergirding the issue networks-
policy communities distinction and then use the results, by offering a
sketch of how network characteristics can help to explain features of
policy instruments.
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Policy Instruments in Theories of Policy
The notion of policy instrument has also enjoyed growing prominence
in recent years. Behind the term is a core idea: the type of mechanism
used in a policy matters – for how and whether the policy is executed,
how a proposed initiative is greeted during policy formation, and how
likely the effort is to achieve the intentions of policy makers.
The type of policy involved during formation has been treated ser-
iously by scholars of public policy at least since the explicit formulation
by Lowi (1964). Unfortunately, theoretical advance has been limited
by a number of factors: proliferation of overlapping and somewhat
incompatible instrument typologies, differing theoretical purposes and
research questions pursued by different researchers, and a relative lack
of attention to careful empirical testing.
On the issue of typologies, as pointed out most prominently by How-
lett (for instance 1991), the ideas of scholars like Salamon (1981),
Hood (1986), Doern and colleagues (Doern and Wilson 1974; Tupper
and Doern 1981), and Linder and Peters (1989) each offer intriguing
insights but also omit key elements possibly necessary for productive
theory building. As of yet, these thought-provoking ideas have not been
fully melded into a coherent and accepted approach. Howlett and
Ramesh (1995) try to rectify this limitation by offering a more compre-
hensive picture (pp. 162–63). On this issue, as for the concept of policy
networks, we opt for parsimony while also working deductively to
strengthen the reach of the perspective.
Second, the research questions posed by investigators have employed
the notion of policy instrument in different ways and toward different
ends (Howlett and Ramesh 1995: 158). Clearly, for instance, attention
by economists to instruments has been focused on the issue of optimiz-
ing the match between instruments and policy problems. The current
article, on the other hand, largely ignores this question and asks one
closer to a political science or policy science perspective: what explains
the choices by governments regarding instruments – whether effective
or ineffective, promising or not? But unlike the perspectives on the
choice of government instruments developed thus far, which have
tended to emphasize unique case history and circumstances, our theor-
etical approach is based on a set of hypothesized matches between types
of policy instruments and general characteristics of the networks com-
prised of government and target groups.
Other, mostly recently, efforts to explain instrument choice offer
hints but also expose gaps. Some researchers imply that instrument
choice can be influenced by the social construction of target groups by
policy makers, without really exploring the pattern of actual inter-
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dependence between the two (Ingram and Schneider 1991; Schneider
and Ingram 1990, 1993). Others focus on emulation, or policy learning,
as a direct driving factor (Rose 1993; Smith and Glick 1995). Addi-
tional researchers emphasize the importance of learning but also note
the complexity and differing depths of cognitive changes that can
accompany learning in often loosely-coupled advocacy coalitions
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1996). Certainly, policy learning
can drive instrument selection under some circumstances, but it is
equally clear that learning processes cannot account for significant por-
tions of policy change and instrument choice (for example, Majone
1991), let alone for the observation that stability in types of instru-
ments chosen is more typical for almost any given sector than is change.
Plausible explanations for instrument choice have been formulated
around the notion of national styles. At the same time, evidence sug-
gests large variation in style across sectors within a given nation (for
instance, Howlett 1991; see also Howlett and Ramesh 1993). Further-
more, shifts in instruments over time sometimes occur over relatively
brief periods, and these occur without any evidence of policy makers’
attending to choices in other countries. Learning and national style
fail to account for a substantial amount of the choice of government
instruments.
A Typology of Policy Networks
Following Hufen and Ringeling (1990b: 6), we define a policy network
as a social system in which actors develop comparatively durable pat-
terns of interaction and communication aimed at policy problems or
policy programs. The focus here in particular is on the patterns observ-
able between the ‘steering’ coalition – normally a government agency
with allies within and without the public sector – and the ‘targeted’
constellation – typically comprised of strong individual organisations
and/or representative organisations along with their allies, which may
include some additional governmental agencies. We refer to these two
parts of the network as ‘government’ and ‘target group’, respectively;
but the referents are the two more carefully defined coalitions just
described.
Policy networks can be typified in many different ways (Bressers,
O’Toole and Richardson 1994a). Network characterizations including
the familiar policy community-issue network distinction, have been
developed in a number of fashions; but nearly all rely on distinctions
along the dimension of integration versus fragmentation. By con-
sidering this general continuum as encompassing both structural and
cognitive-affective characteristics, one can capture two distinct aspects
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of the overall integration-fragmentation dimension, while also avoiding
the tendency among network theorists to focus on properties of network
members rather than on network relations themselves as independent
variables (Dowding 1995). The intensity of actors’ interactions and the
way in which objectives are distributed among the actors are the basic
characteristics of network relations. These can be referred to as intercon-
nectedness and cohesion, respectively (Bressers, Huitema and Kuks 1994).
(Additional features of networks are the distribution of information
and of power. We ignore these dimensions in the present exposition for
the sake of parsimony.)
Interconnectedness refers both to the contacts in the relevant policy
formation process (and the habits that have developed in this connec-
tion over time) and also the relationships between these actors outside
the actual policy process at any particular time (cf. Zijlstra, 1982: 83–
95). Apart from the possibility that these same actors also encounter
each other in other processes, the origination of these relationships
may also depend on the presence of intermediary groups or organiza-
tions designed to improve contacts within the network and possibly
encourage sharing of staff or staff transfers (cf. DiMaggio and Powell
1983: 148).
In neocorporatist nations, one indicator of the degree of intercon-
nectedness would be the degree to which ‘(semi-)private organisations
take part in policy formation by means of formal consultative structures
or by being members of committees or advisory bodies’ (Koppenjan,
Ringeling, and Te Velde 1987: 245–50). More pluralistic systems typic-
ally lack extensive formal mechanisms of connectedness, yet these may
exhibit less full-fledged but nonetheless regular links, including heavily-
used advisory processes. Some scholars assume that the presence of
features like these will result in less imposition of policy choices by
central actors on other interested parties and a consultative, rather
than authoritative, policy style (Koppenjan, Ringeling, and Te Velde
1987). A related implication, we suggest, may be that this dimension
can influence similarly the policy instruments likely to be chosen.
The second central characteristic of a policy network concerns the
distribution of objectives among the actors in the network. Objectives
can range from conflicting through compatible to mutually reinforcing.
Since within every network various actors can have both supportive and
conflicting objectives, a more general variable is needed: ‘cohesion’,
that is, the extent to which individuals, groups, and organizations
empathize with each other’s objectives insofar as these are relevant to
the policy field. This empathy generally stems from shared values and
a shared worldview (cf. the cognitive patterns shared by members of
advocacy coalitions, as depicted by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).
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There may be differences in perspective and also values on a range of
less important matters, for instance, while the networked actors share
tightly consistent values and worldview at more basic levels. In a cohes-
ive network, the consensus is not specific and narrow but rather per-
tains to deeper issues. If there is an extremely high degree of cohesion,
the actors are inclined to self-identify as a cluster: to place the bound-
ary line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on the periphery rather than in the
middle of the network.
Up to a certain point, interconnectedness can be seen as a ‘structural’
characteristic and cohesion as its ‘cultural’ counterpart (cf. Ostrom
1991 on ‘institutional’ and ‘normative’ perspectives). While intercon-
nectedness and cohesion may thus vary together and be mutually sup-
portive, there is no reason to assume that they necessarily covary. More
or less stable forms exhibiting high values on one characteristic and low
values on the other are both theoretically conceivable and empirically
demonstrable. So there is no reason to define these situations a priori
as nonexistent.
Why expect that these network characteristics can influence the
selection of policy instrument types? The theoretical foundation for
such an argument can be elicited from the work of analysts like
Luhmann (1984), who asserts the importance of ‘‘self-reproduction’’ or
autopoieisis as an important characteristic of social systems; and policy
scholars like Majone (1976), who offers a connection between the dis-
tribution of power among social actors and the selection of policy
instruments. Such theoretical bases suggest a tendency that types of
public policy instruments are likely to be selected in such a fashion as
to be congruent with existing social features.
Accordingly, the central proposition of this article is that in general,
the more an instrument’s characteristics help to maintain the existing features of
the network, the more likely it is to be selected during the policy formation process.
This does not mean, of course, that policy instruments cannot be
chosen to subvert or change an existing network. Indeed, we assume
that often specific actors, including government actors, prefer and per-
haps intend major changes of this sort. But as analysts of multiactor
policy processes often remind, policy action is frequently quite different
from what any particular actor intends. Our argument, in fact, is that
there is a process that results in instrument determination, rather than
a particular actor who ‘chooses’. Nor does it mean that the causal arrow
cannot work in the other direction: instruments shaping networks
rather than networks constraining mechanisms. Indeed, the former fol-
lows the more standard logic, with governments sometimes explicitly
seeking network modification. Sometimes, furthermore, the network-
instrument relationship is clearly bidirectional.2 But the theoretical
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argument on which we build treats seriously the notion that extant
network features are a potent determinant of instrument type, and not
always or even usually the reverse.
So the basic proposition we offer deserves some further justification.
As indicated above, a grounding lies in perspectives like those of
Luhmann, who makes a persuasive case for tendencies toward the con-
tinual reproduction of social-systemic characteristics over time. Yet the
formulation in which this argument is typically put explains both too
little and too much. As regards the former, the perspective’s emphasis
on cognitions and communication as dominating explanatory factors
omits other potential explanations for system, or network, reproduction
(see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993 for a framework of policy change
based in part on cognitive dynamics that also considers other causal
factors). A more specific policy-grounded basis for the core proposition
we offer can be seen in the work of Majone (1976), who asserts that
the selection of different policy instruments has little impact on a pol-
icy’s success, since instruments can only be used during the imple-
mentation process insofar as the balance of power allows it, and that
instruments which could change this balance would have considerable
difficulty getting selected in the first place. He argues that even if it
were possible to develop instruments which could be implemented in
spite of powerful opposition, the opponents would prevent the selection
of them during the policy formation process. As a result, the selected
instruments would never pose a serious threat to the existing balance
of power.
This reasoning, of course, is not always fully applicable. And that is
the reason why the autopoieisis approach (as well as Majone’s basic
formulation) explains too much. After all, the balance of power in a
network is not static, and it is precisely the tactical manipulation of
differences in power with different policy processes or at different times
that can eventually lead to a shift in the balance. This point, however,
is no reason to reject Majone’s assumption altogether, and the same
can be said for our basic premise. The development and results of a
policy process can ultimately change the circumstances in which that
policy process operates some years later. But the fact remains that it
is first and foremost the current circumstances which determine the
outcome of a process. It is, for instance, perfectly plausible that the
greater the government’s power in the policy network, the more cap-
able and interested it will be in selecting instruments which give it (or
its allies) the power required to implement the policy.
For the reasons sketched above, emphasis is placed here on exploring
the relationship between the two network characteristics introduced
above other than the one considered exclusively by Majone – that is,
Hans Th. A. Bressers and Laurence J. O’Toole222
TABLE 1 Four Types of Policy Networks, with Examples
Strong interconnectedness Weak interconnectedness
Strong cohesion U.S. agriculture Dutch economic affairs
Weak cohesion Dutch environmental management U.S. environmental protection
our focus is on interconnectedness and cohesion – and the choice of
instruments. For purposes of simplicity, we draw dichotomous distinc-
tions regarding both the degree of interconnectedness and the degree
of cohesion. The result is a typology comprising four types of networks.
This treatment ignores the many intermediate situations likely to occur
in practice.
By way of clarification, Table 1 displays examples for each type of
policy network from two national contexts. In this formulation, as in
the rest of this article, emphasis is placed on the interconnectedness
and cohesion between actors on the governmental side, on the one
hand, and actors with the ‘target group’ and its representatives, on the
other. This portrayal is by no means meant to imply that these two
groups are necessarily or even probably homogeneous and coherent.
We consider first the cases depicted as illustrating strong cohesion,
and then those suggesting weak network cohesion. The American
agricultural sector has long been known for its close relationships
between the target groups (small farmers and agribusiness), the
Department of Agriculture and its associated bureaus, and in fact
various other organizations – including land-grant universities. Des-
pite recent reductions in agricultural subsidies, the policy network
continues to seem largely characterized as depicted in the Table.
The case described is that of American agriculture, but the charac-
terization seems likely to apply to agricultural policy networks in
other countries as well. In the U.S. case, the interconnectedness is
sufficiently strong that the sector is sometimes depicted by analysts
as the one field in which U.S. policy making approximates a cor-
poratist pattern. Compared with this instance, the relationship
between the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands and
Dutch industry is characterized by a weaker degree of intercon-
nectedness (cf. Hufen, 1990). In both cases, however, there is a
strong degree of cohesion. Both ministries are inclined to stand up
for their ‘own’ target groups, or ‘clients’, to promote what is per-
ceived to be the long-term interests of the group as a whole.
As regards U.S. environmental policy, the situation can be typified as
a combination of relatively weak interconnectedness and weak cohesion
between policy makers and target groups (that is, the various categories
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of polluters). Despite efforts by some in recent years to develop more
consensual approaches to industrial sectors, many national environ-
mental bureaucrats see these as their ‘natural enemy’. This point is a
good link to the fourth cell of the matrix. In the same policy field in
the Netherlands, a similar characterization could have been made in
the 1970s. During the succeeding decade, however, the distance
between policy makers and target groups narrowed. This shift can be
attributed to the fact that the then-Environmental Minister and his
successors encouraged an approach based on cooperation with target
groups. The main result was a strong acceleration in the number of
mutual contacts. The Ministry has now even appointed special target-
group managers to maintain these connections, and target group con-
sultation is currently a prominent item on the environmental policy
agenda. Of course, a highly cohesive sector is next to impossible; Dutch
environmental policy is unlikely to approximate the American agricul-
tural ‘iron triangle’, because of the nature of the policy problem – which
itself inevitably entails significant conflict between the parties’
interests.
Characteristics of Policy Instruments
In this section we sketch a set of characteristics of policy instruments
that can be used in the theoretical exposition to follow. These attrib-
utes, like the network dimensions offered in the preceding section, can
be considered institutional features, interpreted as sets of rules specify-
ing relations in a social setting. We treat policy instruments as the
results of choices made for influencing the behaviour, and sometimes
the institutional arrangements, of policy targets into the future. In this
sense, instrument selection is a form of institutional design. Lest we
be accused of thus using tautologially institutional arrangement as both
the dependent and independent variables in our analysis, we should
note that our argument is basically that policy instrument selection to
influence behaviour at time is heavily influenced by networked institu-
tional arrangements at time2: this is the core of the self-reproduction
thesis, and it is neither trivial nor tautological. Furthermore, to avoid
the potential for tautology, we have deliberately sought to avoid incorp-
orating the same characteristics in both the network and the instru-
ment variables. The two clusters are distinct.
Policy instruments have been classified in a variety of fashions
(Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). To relate the probability of the selection
of different instruments to characteristics of policy networks, it is
necessary to identify instrument features that can be logically related
to the distinctive characteristics of different kinds of networks. This
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section seeks to trace the relevant instrument characteristics. In this
regard, shaping network composition itself as a policy instrument is
omitted from consideration; this exclusion is indeed necessary to avoid
framing network features as independent and dependent variables sim-
ultaneously (Bressers and Honigh 1986). A number of aspects of instru-
ments can be discussed, and appropriately relevant characteristics can
be derived.
Our set of instrument characteristics starts by emphasizing the limit-
ative or expansive characteristics of influence efforts, including policies.
‘Expansion’ is used here to denote circumstances in which the instru-
ment makes the totality of behavioural alternatives for the target
actors more feasible or attractive; ‘limitation’ refers to situations in
which the reverse is the case (Bressers and Klok 1988). If we consider
features of policy instruments that limit or expand the range of per-
missible options for policy targets, several would seem to be important.
The first and more direct one is whether a policy instrument involves
the provision or withdrawal of resources to target groups.
Expansion or limitation can also be shaped by adjusting additional
features of policy. One is the presence or absence of a formal freedom
of choice to apply the instrument for the members of the target group.
Some instruments, like certain forms of information and subsidies
available on request, leave choices about action in the hands of the
target actors – they are free to choose whether or not the instrument
is applied to them.
Furthermore, some instruments are framed so that government uni-
laterally acts on target groups, while others build a bilateral or multilat-
eral feature directly into the mechanism. Certain instruments available
to policy makers, like covenants in the Netherlands or negotiated rule
making in the United States (both on issues of environmental policy)
are centred on the notion of ‘horizontal’ mutual adjustment rather than
‘vertical’ rule setting or order giving.
Another distinction among types of policy instruments, that between
economic and judicial or regulatory mechanisms, often gives rise to a
misimpression. Legal instruments are often accompanied by financial
sanctions, while economic instruments are anchored in legal regula-
tions. So rather than making a strict distinction, it is more realistic to
refer to a continuum in which a wide range of concrete instruments
occupy intermediate positions (cf. Bressers 1983; Bressers and Klok
1988). The distinction between ‘economic’ instruments (incentives)
and ‘legal’ instruments (directives) is often based on the question as
to what extent a normative appeal is made to the law-abidingness of the
target group (‘thou shalt’ or ‘thou shalt not’ regulations make such an
appeal, financial incentives do not). In addition, many characteristics
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attributed to incentives or directives rest on the degree to which the
size or intensity of a certain target group behaviour is in proportion to
the size or intensity of the government reaction to that behaviour. In
general, incentives are more proportional to behaviour than regula-
tions, particularly since the latter often draw only a single normative
borderline.
Apart from the selection of policy instruments, the process of policy
formation also usually involves the selection of the implementing
organization(s). In this connection, the role of the policy makers in the imple-
mentation process is important. Does the government also assign itself
(via affiliated organizations, like line agencies or ministries) an import-
ant task in the implementation process? Or are policy makers happy
to leave the challenge of execution to more remote organizations, for
instance relatively independent bodies like government corporations or
lower levels of government? Strictly speaking, these considerations do
not involve a specific instrument characteristic. But the choice can be
an important factor in determining whether and how the instruments
work in practice.
The italicized instrument characteristics concern the degree to which
the instrument involves the provision/withdrawal of resources, the free-
dom to opt for/against application, bi/multilaterality, normative appeal,
proportionality, and the role of government in policy implementation.
These characteristics (with the possible exception of normative appeal)
can be considered institutional rules intended for application in sub-
sequent processes.
Relationships between Network and Instrument Characteristics
This section explores the relationships between the characteristics of
policy instruments and the two network features, cohesion and inter-
connectedness. The basic principle remains the central proposition that
the more an instrument’s characteristics help to maintain the existing
characteristics of the network, the more likely it is to be selected during
the process of policy formation. Other explanatory factors are deliber-
ately excluded from the analysis.
The two network characteristics, interconnectedness and cohesion,
are interrelated; the influence of one may depend partly on the other.
In certain cases, therefore, it is not possible to make a straightforward
link between each of the characteristics independently and the distinct-
ive instrument features. Accordingly, the analysis in this section is
organized around the dependent variables – the instrument character-
istics (we reorder them for ease of exposition). The expectations formu-
lated are then later summarized by type of policy network.
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Normative Appeal
With some instruments, like regulations and persuasive public informa-
tion, the government makes a normative appeal to encourage the tar-
gets to choose or reject a certain type of behaviour. The legitimacy of
the government is thus employed to seek to control behaviour (Bressers
and Klok 1988). Such is not the case with other instruments.
If there is strong cohesion between government and targets, the
main concern of the authorities is to support the target group in its
own efforts to achieve its own aims. The selection of instruments that
make a normative appeal to the target group is then rendered less
necessary: there is no need to draw on government’s legitimacy if the
parties already share a basic normative stance, which is the case for
cohesive networks. Where minor policy adjustments are involved, the
authorities generally aim at detailed aspects of behaviour rather than
at the pattern as a whole. Even when the government acts against the
target’s group immediate preferences, high cohesion can be expected
to limit the deployment of normative instruments. After all, the use of
mandatory regulations would soon undermine the cohesion.
One exception, however, concerns behaviour that is detrimental to
the interests of the entire group. In a situation characterized by strong
cohesion, the government actors and target group actors feel part of
the same collectivity. If individual behaviour threatens to harm the
general interest, the deployment of normative instruments can help
to keep the network intact, thereby confirming the group values and
reinforcing the legitimacy of choosing mandatory regulations (dos and
don’ts). One example is the behaviour of companies which secure com-
petitive advantages by unfair means.
Proportionality
The demands that must be met to achieve proportionality between tar-
gets’ behaviour and government reaction during policy formation and
implementation differ markedly, depending on whether instruments of
general or individual application are considered. General instruments,
like price subsidies and excise duties, require little specific knowledge
of or contact between representatives of government and target groups.
Individualized instruments are a different matter. To design and imple-
ment these, it is necessary to collect detailed information on the target
group’s situation. If the degree of interconnectedness is strong, there
are more opportunities for government bodies to learn about variations
in the target group’s behaviour.
On the other hand, though strong interconnectedness enables the
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selection of better-proportioned individualized instruments, it does not
necessarily provide the motive for doing so. The best way of main-
taining strong cohesion is to take account of target group members’
circumstances. Individually applied instruments which are designed to
be in proportion with the target group’s behaviour are ideal for this
purpose. This type of instrument is therefore most frequently used in
situations where strong interconnectedness and strong cohesion are
combined.
With the more general type of proportionate instruments, these con-
siderations do not apply. Such incentives are not aimed at the behaviour
of individual members of the target group. In fact, with general meas-
ures, the individual members may not even be aware of the existence
of the policy incentive (for instance, a price measure). Where cohesion
is weak, however, the government may be inclined to opt for more
normatively-based measures. In this case, ‘invisible’ control by means
of general incentives would be a less obvious choice.
Providing or Withdrawing Resources to/from the Target Group
The application of some policy instruments requires that the target
group receive funds, powers, rights, know-how or other resources in
exchange for complying with a certain desired behaviour. Alternatively,
resources may be withdrawn from the target group to counter
undesired behaviour. If cohesion is strong, the authorities by definition
are expected to be positively inclined toward the target group’s main
aims. In such situations, and to preserve cohesion, the government is
likely to seek to influence behaviour by rewarding rather than
penalizing.
Strong interconnectedness modifies this relationship somewhat. If
the policy includes frequent communication, politicians and officials
in administrative units often have considerable reason to try to direct
resources to target groups – including program clients. Therefore, par-
ticularly in the case of strong interconnectedness, government organ-
izations are likely to be guided primarily by the consideration that good
relations with the target group are extremely beneficial to the govern-
ment itself – not least to make life easier for the officials involved.
Consequently, the frequent contacts involved in situations of strong
interconnectedness reinforce the tendency to reward the target group.
Target Group’s Freedom to Opt for or against Application
The freedom of target group members to opt for or against the applica-
tion of certain policy instruments is another indicator of the expansive
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character of such instruments. This characteristic differs from the pre-
ceding one (providing/withdrawing resources), although there is prob-
ably some association between the two.
Typically, the target group is free to opt for or against application
in situations in which the government’s objectives are broadly similar
to those of the target group – that is, if there is a high degree of
network cohesion. Where the aim is to stimulate targets to undertake
actions that they themselves perceive as significant (for instance, with
technological innovations in industry), the parties involved in policy
formation can be expected to regard mandatory enforcement as unne-
cessarily heavy-handed and potentially threatening to cohesion. And
vice versa: if the target group is free to opt for or against application,
one can expect – almost by definition – no conflicting objectives
between government and target group. The danger to cohesion is small,
since each member of the target group can simply ignore the policy
whenever that suits the individual’s circumstances. Freedom to opt for
or against application can therefore be seen as a ‘safety valve’ which
protects general consensus in the network.
Instruments involving freedom of choice also obviate the need to
monitor target groups closely. It was noted earlier that strong intercon-
nectedness makes it easier for policy makers to collect target group
information. Offering the group substantial freedom of choice can be
seen, therefore, as a way of dealing with a low degree of intercon-
nectedness. In this case, therefore, the effect on instrument choice of
strong cohesion is reinforced by weak interconnectedness.
Bilaterality or Multilaterality
Covenants are explicitly negotiated, formal understandings between
government and some target entity, like an industrial sector. The
notion behind covenants is that such agreements, when successfully
conducted and when incorporating some responsibility for policy-
relevant goal attainment on the part of the target group itself, can
adapt governmental intentions to the needs, interests, and particular
concerns of a target population and thus achieve policy goals more
effectively and efficiently than authoritative, one-sided governmental
decisions. Agreements like covenants thus involve intensive negoti-
ations not only during implementation but also at the formation
stage (Klok 1989). Such agreements have become increasingly used
in relatively corporatist national settings for issues like environ-
mental policy.
Note that covenants show that ‘bilaterality or multilaterality’ is
not the same thing as ‘freedom to opt for or against application’.
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Those attentive to the notion of formal cooptation can see clearly
that covenants, like regulations, are aimed at limiting the target
group’s freedom of choice during implementation. For this reason,
these instruments are suitable for situations involving weak cohesion.
When networks are strongly cohesive, on the other hand, intensive
negotiations can be avoided if policy makers opt for instruments
providing additional resources and the freedom to choose for or
against application.
A high degree of interconnectedness provides a ‘natural’ context for
bilateral instruments requiring many contacts between the govern-
ment’s policy makers and (representatives of) the target group. The
converse can also be expected: the use of such instruments encourages
the continuation of intensive interaction.
Role of Policy Makers in Implementation
Given the central proposition that network characteristics tend to
reproduce themselves in a given setting, one could expect that strong
interconnectedness would promote the implementation of policies by
organizations that also participate in policy formation – thus preserving
the pattern of continuous mutual involvement. Continuing involvement
during implementation would help to maintain strong intercon-
nectedness, while the availability of these contacts encourages the
involvement of the network’s parties in implementation.
Even for cases exhibiting strong cohesion, policy makers are likely to
be reluctant to entrust the full responsibility for implementation to
lower authorities or other institutions outside the network, particularly
if these others harbor unknown or less supportive attitudes. If the
target group is opposed to the policy, policy makers would want to keep
implementation in their own hands. In the more likely case that the
instrument consists of the provision of additional resources, application
by a unit within the network helps to reinforce cohesion. In both cases,
this pattern provides reasons to entrust implementation to organiza-
tions from within the network that have also participated in policy
formation.
These two influences have a mutually reinforcing effect. Under
strong interconnectedness and strong cohesion, policies are imple-
mented almost exclusively by organizations from within the network.
As noted above, where strong cohesion is combined with weak intercon-
nectedness, it is sometimes necessary to set up intermediary structures
to facilitate implementation. Only with both weak cohesion and weak
interconnectedness is implementation likely to take place, without
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pressure from outside the network, in a decentralized fashion and with
little direct supervision from central policy makers.
Four Network Types and the Choice of Policy Instruments
In the preceding section, policy instrument characteristics were used
to explore some accompanying links with features of policy networks.
In this section, the procedure is reversed: the findings are used to craft
a short inventory of the kinds of instruments likely to be adopted in
different types of policy networks. We emphasize again that our aim is
not to determine which policy instruments are the ‘best’ in various
situations. It is also important to bear in mind that this array offers
only a partial analysis: it assumes a severe restriction on the explana-
tory factors and derives expectations from one central proposition.
Including other assumptions or variables would certainly lead to more
detailed conclusions than those set out below. The examples introduced
earlier are used below to illustrate the relationships. Their mention
constitutes a brief check on the reasonableness of the expectations but
does not amount to a test of the hypotheses.
To present the full set of relationships, we draw explicitly from the
logic of the preceding section. Four sets of broad hypotheses can be
sketched and then discussed briefly. Each is connected to one of the
four types of policy networks. For each network type, we hypothesize
likely characteristics of policy instruments.
Networks with Strong Cohesion and Strong Interconnectedness
The basic hypothesis here is: The more a policy network is characterized by
strong cohesion and strong interconnectedness, the more the instruments selected are
likely to be characterized by: the absence of a normative appeal to the targets, except
for behaviour damaging to the target group as a whole; proportionality; a net
provision of additional resources to the target group; freedom for target groups to
opt for or against application of the instrument; bilateral or multilateral arrange-
ments; and implementation by policy makers or organizations closely affiliated with
them.
How does this hypothesis translate into the more usual language
to characterize policy instruments? A simple summary is that in such
networks, we can expect a rather pragmatic and straightforward choice
of instruments. The emphasis here can be expected to be on subsidies
and personal information (education and advice), but there is also room
for whatever other types of instruments may be necessary to keep the
network intact and cohesive.
This general point can be expanded with some specifics. When the
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overall group interest is involved, direct regulation can be expected.
There is also a clear tendency, however, to provide the target group
with additional resources. The emphasis is on supportive instruments,
like research, information, and subsidies. (Incidentally, the net addition
of resources may consist, on the one hand, of resources being with-
drawn – for instance, by imposing fees – and, on the other, of these
same fees or other larger flows of resources being pumped back into
the target group for alternative purposes.) Implementation is entrusted
as little as possible to proxies (Kettl 1987), institutions at a distance.
‘More complex’ instruments requiring an extensive exchange of
information between government and individual members of the target
group need not necessarily be avoided. The participants’ strong sense
of belonging to a group makes it possible – to a much greater extent
than with the other three types of network – to consider the selection of
instruments as a ‘technicality’ which can be approached pragmatically.
As an example of such a network, the U.S. agriculture sector can be
considered. It is well known that a wide range of instruments have
been used in this field, with emphases on research; subsidies and price
supports; and huge efforts at information provision, targeted advice,
education, and technical assistance. Nonetheless, other kinds of instru-
ments like regulations and some fees have also been used where the
interests of the group as a whole have been at stake. Note, however,
the striking absence of regulations aimed at restricting freedom of
action on issues that do not involve network survival. In addition,
information is often provided through direct contact – that is, not
merely in written documentation and mass-media communications, but
mainly in the form of targeted advice and education. And implementers
are almost solely located within the sector and include national and
state agricultural agencies as well as farmers’ organizations themselves.
Networks with Strong Cohesion and Weak Interconnectedness
Here the core hypothesis is as follows: The more a policy network is charac-
terized by strong cohesion and weak interconnectedness, the more the instruments
chosen are likely to be characterized by the absence of a normative appeal, except
in the case of behaviour damaging to the target group as a whole; proportionality
(though weaker than for the networks strong on both dimensions, since the use of
individually-applied instruments often requires intermediaries); provision of addi-
tional resources to the target group; considerable freedom for target groups to opt
for or against application; an absence of bilateral arrangements; and implementa-
tion by policy makers or intermediary organizations.
The general tendency of instrument selection in such networks can
be sketched simply: with strong cohesion but weak interconnectedness,
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an emphasis on investment and research subsidies as well as written
information can be expected. In settings of this type, mechanisms like
investment subsidies, research subsidies, and written and mass-media
information can be anticipated – often with the involvement of interme-
diary organizations. Price measures can also be useful, provided that
these are seen as positive incentives.
In the earlier discussion of network types, the relationship between
the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Dutch industry was
given as an example of a pattern with strong cohesion and weak
interconnectedness. Technology instruments continue to be used in
this sector, as do positive price incentives. One example of the latter
has been the successful attempt to keep electricity prices low for
large-scale users in the Netherlands, even though this success for
economic policy has had negative consequences for policy efforts on
energy conservation.
Networks with Weak Cohesion and Weak Interconnectedness
The more a policy network is characterized by weak cohesion and weak intercon-
nectedness, the more the instruments selected are likely to be characterized by a
normative appeal, an absence of proportionality, withdrawal of resources from the
target group, only limited ability on the part of the target group to opt for or
against application, an absence of bilateral arrangements, and implementation
characterized by involvement of parties other than policy makers and organizations
closely tied to them.
What does this set of characteristics mean in concrete terms? The
emphasis is clearly expected to be on regulations. In policy formation,
no real attempt is made to achieve proportionality between behaviour
and governmental reaction. Since the responsibility for implementing
the policy is often passed on to other authorities, it is possible to opt
for licensing systems which do necessitate individualized implementa-
tion (that is, by others).
This description corresponds fairly well with the environmental
policy that took shape in the U.S. from the 1970s down to the present.
This is so despite some initiatives aimed at the use of economic instru-
ments and others intended to emphasize more bi- or multilateral
arrangements. Indeed, in the near term at least, the networks-based
explanation helps to render understandable the persistent difficulties
American policy analysts have had in getting adoption of some of the
economic and consensual instruments that have been recommended so
frequently.
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Networks with Weak Cohesion and Strong Interconnectedness
The more a policy network is characterized by weak cohesion and strong intercon-
nectedness, the more the selected instruments are likely to be characterized by a
normative appeal; proportionality, provided instruments are individually applied;
limited withdrawal of resources; an absence of freedom for the target group; many
bi- or multilateral arrangements; and implementation by policy makers themselves
or by affiliated organizations.
The hypothesis asserts that in these policy networks, one should be
able to find instruments which are based on bi- or multilateral arrange-
ments and also make a normative appeal. The joint impact is an
emphasis on the target group’s own responsibility during consultative
meetings. In appealing to this personal sense of responsibility, policy
makers can try to secure the commitment of the target group. This
commitment can then be officially laid down in agreements (like coven-
ants in neocorporatist settings). The ministry or agency supervises com-
pliance and thus continues to play an active role. The target group’s
own sense of responsibility can also be reinforced by imposing certain
obligations, such as liability insurance or research, reporting, and
information requirements.
This package of policy instruments is quite close to what has
emerged in the Netherlands regarding ‘new’ instruments for environ-
mental policy during the past several years. The intentional intensi-
fication of contacts between the Dutch Environmental Ministry and its
target group during the 1980s and since (pressed by three successive
environmental ministers) has altered the network structure from its
character during the 1970s, when the sector looked much like that in
the U.S. The shift in network structure, according to our hypotheses,
can help to account for a consequent shift in instruments during the
same period. This example suggests, in turn, that a more efficacious
approach to improving the likelihood of government’s adopting the
technically ‘optimal’ policy instruments may be by attempting to craft
network characteristics themselves – establishing intermediary organ-
izations, intensifying contacts, creating a government with a high likeli-
hood of a cohesive relationship with target groups – rather than simply
taking policy makers to task for having chosen ‘wrong’. Often, nonethe-
less, the character of the network will change without any intentional
program of network alteration.
A Comparative Illustration
The theoretical sketch just offered outlines a set of testable proposi-
tions. An additional opportunity to indicate the potential of such an
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approach is provided by a recently-concluded four-nation comparative
study of water policy networks in Germany, Britain, the Netherlands,
and the United States (Bressers, O’Toole and Richardson 1994b).3 This
study is useful to consider in this regard since it was crafted as a single
comparative inquiry, with relevant data but absent the idea of testing
these hypotheses. The purpose was otherwise, thus no deliberate selec-
tion bias is entailed. The investigation, based on detailed interviews
among policy actors in each country as well as analysis of relevant docu-
ments and literature, produced portraits of each country’s water policy
networks not only currently but also stretching back for a couple of
decades. In each case, there have been shifts in network character-
istics – from networks relatively high in both interrelatedness and cohe-
sion toward more diverse, less tightly interconnected, and less cohesive
arrays. In each case, changes in policy instruments can also be observed,
in particular shifts from heavy subsidies and informational support
toward more regulatory approaches. This pattern obtains despite large
differences in political systems and moderate differences in problem
severity.
More specifically, the particulars of the changes in national instru-
ments have differed across the countries during the last 20 years, with
the kinds of shifts largely correlated – even at the subsectoral level –
with the dynamics of network shifts over time. In particular, in the
U.S., which exhibited less consensual and interconnected networks than
in the other countries studied, a comparatively more regulatory appar-
atus was already apparent during the 1970s. And although additional
regulatory forms have appeared in the United States, especially regard-
ing water-supply issues in the arid West, the degree of instrument
change seems less than in Britain or in a portion of the water sector
in the Netherlands. Britain has moved to a less integrated (in fact an
explicitly privatized) network, and more direct regulatory instruments
have indeed developed and replaced earlier instruments. Note that this
is not simply the trivial point that once government privatizes, it needs
to exert some regulatory control. Rather, prior to privatization, the
instruments used for British drinking water in particular were highly
consensual and the network much more community-like. The move
toward a more antagonistically regulatory approach has come to some
degree to the surprise of certain water experts in the UK.
The Dutch case is slightly more complicated but also supportive of
the theory. Here the water sector needs to be considered in terms of
two different network patterns. The water supply side changed during
this period to a looser and less consensual array, and the Ministry of
Economic Affairs has responded with more involvement in price set-
ting – including increased criticism of private tariff-setting and more
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regulatory pressure for efficiency. For surface water quality, on the
other hand, the relatively tight and consensual network of water
authorities and industrial actors from earlier days remains largely
intact. In this latter sub-case, the observed instrument pattern that
evolved during the seventies and eighties – that is, negotiated agree-
ments in a permanent committee with representatives of industry on
standard setting as a basis for permit-giving – continues. Finally, the
German case (leaving aside issues raised by unification) is somewhat
difficult to characterize from the data available. The primary reason
is that the distance between water suppliers and authorities is quite
large (or, interconnectedness is almost absent), and it is also difficult
to identify any clearly central policy on such issues. (‘Policies’, such as
they are, are more or less ‘in house’ within companies.) The German
case is not so much a refutation of one of the theoretical propositions
as it is a complicated empirical case. And indeed, it suggests a refine-
ment: where networks as we define them are virtually absent, so too
may be policy and policy instruments. In the other four instances (two
national cases and two Dutch sub-cases), the shifts in instruments have
been generally consistent with the dynamics of network shifts over
time. And the Dutch evidence supports indirectly something like the
hypothesized link rather than, for instance, an explanation rooted in
the notion of national, or even sectoral, policy style.
It is hazardous to draw firm conclusions regarding networks as causal
forces in observed changes such as these (Bressers and O’Toole 1994).
Correlations, even when correctly observed and appropriately docu-
mented, may well be spurious. But it is worth noting that the network
and instrument changes in these cases, while broadly consistent with
each other and with the theory’s expectations, have occurred with little
evidence of lesson drawing or policy learning across national boundaries
(Bressers, O’Toole and Richardson 1994b). (Some learning may be
evidenced on the subject of challenges to public financing that emerged
in similar fashions in the countries analysed.) This point does not dem-
onstrate conclusively that indirect forms of learning do not account for
a portion of the shifts – particularly for the European cases, since the
development of a European-level water policy discussion recently pro-
vides many opportunities for diffusion of information. Indeed, theoret-
ical and empirical claims of institutional isomorphism, as developed
in the research literature on organizations, suggest that learning and
cross-sectional diffusion can well extend beyond policies to structural
features. But the evidence does indicate the plausibility of the link
emphasized in the present article.
And any hypothesis based on European-level learning on the part of
policy actors across countries would need to be compared in its explan-
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atory potential with an approach such as the one outlined here. In
particular, emerging European-level water policy networks may exhibit
structural attributes that help to drive some of the developments in
the selection of EU water policy instruments, which in turn can be
background or contextual conditions influencing national-level choices.
This possibility would then generally be a European version of a kind
of two-level policy game to be expected as well in other multilayered
political systems (see note 2 above).
Conclusion
This article has aimed to connect two different but potentially related
streams of policy research: one focusing on policy networks and another
analysing policy instruments. We argue that the two can and should
be linked, and that certain gaps in existing policy research – regarding
the use of the policy networks notion as an independent variable in
explaining policy-relevant phenomena, as well as on explanations for
observable patterns of governmental adoption of policy instruments –
can be partially filled by making this connection in a theoretically
meaningful way. Developing this link in theoretical form has been the
purpose of this article.
This idea has led us to offer some straightforward and testable
expectations for when and where we are likely to find such different
instruments as subsidies, regulations, and information adopted. Note
that the explanation explicitly avoids focusing on either an economic
logic (matching instruments to policy problem characteristics) or any
other ‘problem’-based theoretical reasoning. In a world where govern-
ments could be in more-or-less unilateral control, they might have the
luxury of crafting policy instruments through such a technocratic
matching process. In today’s real world, in which democratic aspirations
heavily permeate policy formation and where power is dispersed rather
than congealed in ministries or other centres of decision, the network
of relations in a policy sphere is likely to frame the selection of rules for
shaping future policy-oriented action. That, at least, is the argument we
have been sketching.
To make such an argument is by no means to demonstrate its accu-
racy. Indeed, for all the theorizing about policy instrument selection
to date, there have been no systematic empirical tests thus far. This
gap is not fully addressed directly in the present article, although we
have intended to show the reasonableness of the theory offered in the
preceding pages.
The networked context of policy formation deserves attention as a
partial shaper of public policy. The best way of optimizing policies may
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be to look beyond the instruments themselves and into the social set-
ting in which they – or agreements about them – are actually shaped.
NOTES
1. Dutch research on networks and also on instruments is an exception. Work on these topics in
the Netherlands has been extensive, but thus far relatively little of this material is available
to broader audiences. Research is also currently underway in the Netherlands to develop, refine,
and test policy theory incorporating both network and instrument characteristics as variables.
This article broadens the important Dutch line of inquiry and links it more fully to the interna-
tional research literature.
2. Interestingly, empirical evidence can be sketched to indicate that policy and policy instrument
choice at one level can influence network characteristics at another level, with these network
features in turn shaping instrument selection at the second level. This characterization fits
the U.S. subnational choice of instruments by the New York City Water Board to deal with
an important target group in the agriculture sector (a Watershed Agricultural Council) –
within the City’s watershed: individual assistance to improve nonpoint source protection by
helping farmers to design and execute detailed ‘‘farm plans’’ with heavy and proportional
government subsidies. Certain network features (high cohesion and interconnectedness) were
encouraged in this region by the requirements of national regulatory policy; and these network
features, once established, appear to have shaped the New York-level policy instrument. See
O’Toole 1998.
3. Actually, two additional cases are included in the full study: Hungary and the European Union.
These are omitted from discussion here, since their unique features – regime transition and
relative newness, respectively – needlessly complicate the analysis for present purposes.
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